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In the past decade, the rapid growth of specialty hospitals focused on 
profitable service lines, including cardiac and orthopedic care, has 
prompted concerns about general hospitals’ ability to compete. Critics 
contend specialty hospitals actively draw less-complicated, more-profit-
able patients with Medicare and private insurance away from general 
hospitals, threatening general hospitals’ ability to cross-subsidize less-
profitable services and provide uncompensated care. A contentious 
debate has ensued, but little research has addressed whether specialty 
hospitals adversely affect the financial viability of general hospitals 
and their ability to care for low-income, uninsured and Medicaid 
patients. Despite initial challenges recruiting staff and maintaining 
service volumes and patient referrals, general hospitals were generally 
able to respond to the initial entry of specialty hospitals with few, if 
any, changes in the provision of care for financially vulnerable patients, 
according to a new study by the Center for Studying Health System 
Change (HSC) of three markets with established specialty hospitals—
Indianapolis, Phoenix and Little Rock, Ark. In addition, safety net 
hospitals—general hospitals that care for a disproportionate share of 
financially vulnerable patients—reported limited impact from specialty 
hospitals since safety net hospitals generally do not compete for insured 
patients. 
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Is the Playing Field Level?
Amid concerns that specialty hospitals 
“cream-skim” more-profitable, less-compli-
cated, well-insured patients from general 
hospitals, Congress in 2003 mandated an 
18-month Medicare moratorium on physi-
cian self-referrals to new physician-owned 
specialty hospitals, effectively stalling their 
development (See box on page 3 for more 
about specialty hospital pros and cons). 
Specialty hospitals and general hospitals 
typically compete for profitable service lines, 
such as cardiac and orthopedic care, which 
because of unintended payment rate distor-
tions tend to be more lucrative.1 
General hospitals often rely on profitable 
services and patients to subsidize unprofit-
able services and patients. Faced with the 
loss of profitable services and patients to 
specialty hospitals, some feared that general 
hospitals might curtail emergency services, 
close burn or psychiatric units or provide 
less uncompensated care. Whether specialty 
hospitals compromise general hospitals’ 
financial viability and ability to cross-subsi-
dize care for financially vulnerable popula-
tions—low-income, uninsured and Medicaid 
patients—remains a debated issue.2
Since the 2003 moratorium, a body of 
research has been conducted evaluating phy-
sician-owned specialty hospitals. Generally, 
the research indicates that specialty hospitals 
treat less-complex patients with lower acu-
ity3 and a higher proportion of patients with 
2more generous insurance coverage.4 In 
addition, physician ownership interests in 
specialty hospitals may result in referral 
patterns that shift patient volume from 
general to specialty hospitals.5 
In 2007, in an effort to improve pay-
ment accuracy based on patient acuity 
and reduce cream skimming by all types 
of hospitals—which rely on Medicare for 
a significant portion of their revenue—
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services began phasing in severity-
based adjustments and other changes to 
Medicare payments for inpatient care. 
Specialty Hospitals in 
Three Communities
This study examines the impact of spe-
cialty hospitals—cardiac, surgical and 
orthopedic—on the ability of general and 
safety net hospitals to care for financially 
vulnerable patients in Indianapolis, Little 
Rock and Phoenix (see Data Source). 
While these markets are not nationally 
representative, and specialty hospitals 
represent a relatively limited share of the 
overall inpatient market, their experi-
ences are useful in illustrating the range 
of hospital responses to the market entry 
of specialty hospitals. Each of the three 
communities has an established presence 
of specialty hospitals, general hospitals 
that provide care to financially vulnerable 
populations and a major safety net hospi-
tal that primarily serves low-income and 
uninsured patients.
The three communities vary in terms 
of ownership structures of specialty hos-
pitals (see Table 1) and the level of spe-
cialty physician consolidation. However, 
all three markets lack certificate-of-need 
requirements that can restrict the growth 
of specialty hospitals. 
In Indianapolis, where there are a 
few very large single-specialty medical 
groups,6 cardiac specialty hospitals began 
as joint ventures between local general 
hospital systems and physicians. Over 
time, they became majority-owned by the 
hospital systems. In Little Rock, which 
has large single-specialty medical groups,7 
the only stand-alone cardiac specialty 
hospital is owned by physicians affiliated 
in a medical group and MedCath, a cor-
poration that operates specialty hospitals. 
In Phoenix, with fewer single-specialty 
Center for Studying Health System Change Research Brief No. 11 • April 2009
2
medical groups than Little Rock,8 one of the 
cardiac specialty hospitals also is owned by 
physicians and MedCath, while the surgical 
specialty hospital is wholly owned by phy-
sicians. Orthopedic specialty hospitals in 
the three communities are typically wholly 
owned by physicians. 
Specialty hospitals in the three markets 
were established between 2000 and 2005, 
with the exception of a heart hospital in 
Little Rock in 1997 and a heart hospital in 
Phoenix in 1998. Across all three markets, 
general hospital systems lacking ownership 
interest in stand-alone specialty hospitals 
operate competing specialty-service lines, 
for example, through a center of excellence 
for cardiac care or orthopedics. 
General Hospitals Respond 
and Adapt to Competition 
from Specialty Hospitals
Study respondents identified several ways 
that specialty hospital competition affected 
the financial well-being of general and safe-
ty net hospitals through competition for 
physicians and other staff, new challenges 
Study respondents identified sev-
eral ways that specialty hospital 
competition affected the financial 
well-being of general and safety 
net hospitals through competition 
for physicians and other staff, 
new challenges in providing 
emergency department (ED) on-
call coverage and decreases in 
service volume.
Data Source
To examine the impact of specialty hospitals on the ability of general and safety net 
hospitals to care for vulnerable populations, HSC conducted key stakeholder interviews 
in three Community Tracking Study communities with an established presence of spe-
cialty hospitals. These communities are Indianapolis, Little Rock and Phoenix. In each 
of these communities, researchers interviewed representatives from physician practices, 
community health centers, emergency medical services, medical societies, hospital 
associations, state regulatory agencies, and other respondents who could provide a 
market-wide perspective. Interviews also were conducted with hospital executives of at 
least two general hospitals, two specialty hospitals and one safety net hospital in each 
community, with the exception of Little Rock. Researchers were unable to interview 
executives from the two specialty hospitals in Little Rock (because of ongoing litigation 
(heart hospital) and changes in leadership (surgical hospital)). The findings are based 
on semi-structured phone interviews with 43 respondents conducted by two-person 
interview teams between March and June 2008, and interveiw data were analyzed using 
Atlas.ti, a qualitative software package. 
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  in providing emergency department (ED) 
on-call coverage and decreases in service 
volume. Respondents reported little, if any, 
change in patient acuity in general hospi-
tals. And respondents more often attributed 
changes in payer mix to the rising rate of 
uninsured people in the market generally, 
rather than the loss of patient volume to 
specialty hospitals. General hospitals were 
more likely than safety net hospitals to feel 
the impact of competition from specialty 
hospitals. 
Competition for Staff and 
Emergency Call Coverage
Specialty hospitals initially attracted physi-
cians and other staff from general hospitals 
and, to a lesser extent, safety net hospitals. 
An ownership stake in a specialty hospital 
enables physicians to have a larger role 
in hospital governance and share in the 
hospital’s profits. A few general hospitals 
reported losing significant numbers of 
cardiologists, orthopedists or other special-
ists who left to start their own hospitals or 
enter joint ventures with a corporate entity. 
For physicians, specialty hospitals can 
offer greater control over their work envi-
ronment, such as more predictable schedul-
ing and more access to operating rooms 
and diagnostic equipment. Respondents 
also noted that physicians may be drawn to 
specialty hospitals because of efficiencies 
associated with focusing on a single ser-
vice line and the opportunity to see more 
patients at one location, reducing the inef-
ficiency of traveling among hospitals. 
Specialty hospitals also increased com-
petition for other clinical staff, such as 
nurses and diagnostic technicians, by offer-
ing competitive compensation packages 
and more predictable work hours. As one 
specialty hospital respondent noted, “We 
have been very successful at recruiting 
full-time nurses. And nurses are in a short-
age, so I imagine there is some withdrawal 
[from other hospitals].” Specialty hospitals 
also enable non-physician staff to focus on 
a particular specialty, potentially creating 
a less stressful and more predictable work 
environment compared with general hospi-
tals where the demands of the patients and 
physicians change daily.
Safety net hospitals in two markets that 
also are academic medical centers reported 
being somewhat buffered from losing phy-
sicians, because physicians at these hospi-
tals are often employees and would have to 
start or join a private practice to move to 
a specialty hospital. Also academic medi-
cal centers have complex case loads and 
teaching opportunities that attract physi-
cians. Respondents also noted that their 
physicians, nurses and other staff may be 
Policy Context 
The Pros and Cons of Specialty Hospitals
Pros Cons
Drawing on the theory of focused facto-
ries, proponents contend that specialty 
hospitals can secure high volumes, thereby 
improving quality and reducing costs.
Specialty hospitals may raise the bar for 
quality and encourage general hospitals to 
implement quality improvement strategies 
to compete effectively.
Specialty hospitals offer patients better 
amenities and achieve higher patient sat-
isfaction. 
Specialty hospitals offer physicians greater 
control over management decisions affect-
ing productivity and quality. 
Specialty hospitals tend to treat lower- acu-
ity, well-insured patients while avoiding 
uninsured and Medicaid patients.
Opponents contend that specialty hospital 
competition threatens the ability of general 
hospitals to cross-subsidize less-profitable 
services and patients.
Specialty hospitals may be unable to manage 
emergencies effectively as some do not have 
physicians on site at all times.
Ownership structure of specialty hospitals 
may encourage physician self-referrals and 
overutilization of services.
Sources: Department of Health and Human Services: Office of the Inspector General, OEI-02-06-00310, Physician-Owned 
Specialty Hospitals’ Ability to Manage Medical Emergencies (January 2008); Choudry, Sujit, Niteesh K. Choudry, and Troyen 
A. Brennan, “Specialty Versus Community Hospitals: What Role for the Law?” Health Affairs, Web exclusive (Aug. 9, 2005); 
Cram, Peter, et al., “Insurance Status of Patients Admitted To Specialty Cardiac And Competing General Hospitals: Are 
Accusations Of Cherry Picking Justified,” Medical Care, Vol. 46, No. 5 (May 2008); Devers, Kelly, Linda R. Brewster and 
Paul B. Ginsburg, Specialty Hospitals: Focused Factories or Cream Skimmers? Issue Brief No. 62, Center for Studying Health 
System Change, Washington, D.C. (April 2003); Greenwald, Leslie, et al., “Specialty Versus Community Hospitals: Referrals, 
Quality, and Community Benefits,” Health Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 1 (January/February 2006).
An ownership stake in a specialty hospital enables physicians to 
have a larger role in hospital governance and share in the hospital’s 
profits. A few general hospitals reported losing significant numbers 
of cardiologists, orthopedists or other specialists who left to start their 
own hospitals or enter joint ventures with a corporate entity.
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attracted to the organizations’ mission to 
serve the underserved in the community. 
General and safety net hospitals also 
faced challenges getting specialists who 
retain admitting privileges at their facilities 
to take on-call coverage and this situation 
has worsened because of the entry of spe-
cialty hospitals, according to respondents. 
Physicians practicing at specialty hospitals 
with very small or no emergency depart-
ments have little or no obligation for ED 
call coverage. Specialists, particularly 
newly trained physicians with different 
lifestyle expectations—such as work-life 
balance, shorter work weeks—than previ-
ous generations, may prefer not to have 
on-call obligations and may choose to 
practice at a specialty hospital rather than 
a general hospital. Or they may threaten to 
move to a specialty hospital in negotiating 
for reduced call responsibilities at general 
hospitals. 
According to one hospital association 
respondent, “Every hospital has a require-
ment in their bylaws that physicians will 
take ED call as part of having medical staff 
privileges. More and more physicians are 
saying ‘I don’t care what’s in the bylaws, 
I’m not doing it. You can throw me off 
the medical staff.’ Specialty hospitals have 
contributed to and exacerbated the problem 
[lack of ED call coverage] without a doubt, 
but the problem is beyond them.” 
General hospitals have responded to 
the increased competition for staff and call 
coverage in various ways. Some hospitals, 
particularly those that have lost special-
ist physicians to specialty hospitals, have 
employed specialists or aggressively aligned 
with specialists who practice at multiple 
facilities via contractual arrangements, 
encouraging them to concentrate their 
practice at a particular hospital. This strat-
egy also helped general hospitals rebound 
from initial losses in service volume to 
specialty hospitals. General hospitals also 
reported adapting the hospital environment 
to better accommodate physicians’ prefer-
ences, such as making more operating 
rooms available to them. 
One Little Rock general hospital took a 
more aggressive approach, using economic 
credentialing for its medical staff, which 
bars physicians with admitting privileges or 
their family members from having financial 
interests in competing specialty hospitals. 
In recent years, there have been highly 
publicized court cases related to the general 
hospital’s economic credentialing policy, 
as well as a lawsuit alleging that the gen-
eral hospital aligned with the state’s largest 
insurer to avoid competition by keeping 
physicians affiliated with specialty hospitals 
out of the insurer’s network. Finally, general 
Table 1 
Specialty Hospitals by Site, Primary Service Line and Ownership Structure
Number 
of 
Specialty 
Hospitals
Primary Service Line Ownership Structure
Site Cardiac Orthopedic/
Surgical 
Specialty
Hospital Mixed1 Physicians2
Indianapolis 4 3 1 1 2 1
Little Rock 2 1 1 0 0 2
Phoenix 5 2 3 1 2 2
1 Specialty hospitals with a mixed ownership structure are partially owned by a hospital and partially owned by physicians.
2 Specialty hospitals that are physician-owned are owned by a group of independent physicians, a physician group, or a mix of 
physicians and a hospital management company, such as MedCath or National Surgical Hospitals.
Some hospitals, particularly 
those that have lost specialist 
physicians to specialty hospitals, 
have employed specialists or 
aggressively aligned with spe-
cialists who practice at multiple 
facilities via contractual arrange-
ments, encouraging them to 
concentrate their practice at a 
particular hospital.
and safety net hospitals often have to pay 
significant money to ensure emergency call 
coverage and, in some cases, recruit spe-
cialists from outside of the market, which 
has resulted in increased costs.
Changes in Service Volume
General hospitals in all three communi-
ties and a safety net hospital in Little Rock 
observed a drop in service volume upon 
the entry of specialty hospitals. Some 
respondents suggested that the drop in ser-
vice volume may have been caused at least 
in part by the loss of patients as physicians 
left the general hospital staff to join the 
specialty hospital staff. Additionally, spe-
cialists with privileges at both general and 
specialty hospitals may have begun prefer-
entially referring patients to the specialty 
hospital. However, hospital executives 
acknowledged that other factors beyond 
specialty hospitals might have affected 
their service volumes. 
According to hospital executives, some 
market factors may have shielded general 
hospitals from worse losses in service 
volume. Phoenix—which has experienced 
rapid population growth in recent years—
had relatively low per-capita hospital 
capacity, which may have ensured suffi-
cient patient demand to offset any notice-
able drop in service volume at general 
hospitals when specialty hospitals entered 
the market. Respondents also noted that 
changes in medical technology may have 
prompted a decline in cardiac service vol-
ume at general hospitals—there has been 
a nationwide drop in cardiac surgeries 
because of increased use of stents and bal-
loon angioplasty as alternatives to cardiac 
bypass surgery. According to a Little Rock 
hospital respondent, “There have been 
trends in technology offerings related to 
fewer bypass procedures and more proce-
dures in the catheterization lab. So there’s 
a definite decrease in surgical procedures 
that’s not necessarily related to the heart 
hospital.”
Safety net hospitals reported little 
impact on service volume because of the 
presence of specialty hospitals, since safety 
net hospitals generally do not compete 
intensely for patients with private insur-
ance or Medicare. According to one safety 
net hospital respondent, “Our competitors 
don’t want us to fail…they don’t want us 
to compete, but don’t want us to go away 
because then they’d have to deal with our 
patients.”
General hospitals and a safety net 
hospital reported using various strategies 
to respond to the initial losses in service 
volume. As discussed earlier, general hos-
pitals increased employment of specialists 
or more tightly aligned themselves with 
specialists as strategies to retain staff and 
to preserve, if not grow, service volume. 
General hospitals in Indianapolis and Little 
Rock, for example, reported developing 
new specialty-service lines, mainly for 
orthopedic services. Respondents noted 
that some general hospitals began advertis-
ing campaigns to promote cardiac services 
and facilities as a way to increase demand. 
A state insurance regulator explained, 
“General hospitals are doing a whole lot of 
advertising now. And the area of heart and 
cancer are two of the areas where they’re 
doing a lot of heavy advertising and seeing 
they need to do that to compete.”
Changes in Patient Acuity      
and Case-Mix Severity
General and safety net hospital respon-
dents generally did not observe specialty 
hospitals as cream skimming less-compli-
cated, lower-risk patients. General hospital 
respondents in Little Rock and Phoenix 
reported higher patient acuity since the 
entry of specialty hospitals but couldn’t 
specifically attribute this to specialty hos-
pitals. Moreover, respondents reported 
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Safety net hospitals reported 
little impact on service volume 
because of the presence of 
specialty hospitals, since safety 
net hospitals generally do not 
compete intensely for patients 
with private insurance or 
Medicare.
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that transfers from specialty hospitals to 
general or safety net hospitals generally are 
rare in contrast to recent media reports that 
specialty hospitals off-load complicated 
patients to general and safety net hospitals.9 
Changes in Payer Mix
A few general and safety net hospitals 
noted serving more financially vulnerable 
patients. In some cases, hospitals attributed 
these changes in payer mix to a loss of 
insured patients to specialty hospitals. More 
often, however, respondents, particularly 
safety net hospitals, attributed changes 
in payer mix to an overall increase in the 
number of uninsured in their respective 
markets. Further, the leading general hos-
pitals likely were able to cost shift to private 
payers by negotiating increases in payment 
rates to cross-subsidize losses from charity 
care and Medicaid.  
Respondents observed little impact 
on payer mix from the introduction of 
Medicare severity-adjusted diagnostic 
related groups that allow higher reimburse-
ments for sicker patients. These reimburse-
ment changes haven’t yet had the leveling 
effect between general hospitals and spe-
cialty hospitals (boosting reimbursement to 
general hospitals and reducing reimburse-
ment to specialty hospitals) anticipated 
by policy makers, assuming the presence 
of cream skimming by specialty hospitals. 
According to respondents, the changes 
helped all hospitals caring for a greater pro-
portion of higher-severity patients. General 
and specialty hospitals that have a mix 
of patients with different levels of acuity 
reported seeing no change in payments. 
Other Challenges Emerge
While specialty hospitals affected general 
hospitals’ ability to attract and retain physi-
cians and other staff and service volumes, 
general hospitals’ responses limited the 
impact on their financial viability. In a 2006 
study, the Medicare Payment Advisory 
Commission (MedPAC) similarly reported 
that, “While specialty hospitals took profit-
able surgical patients from the competitor 
community hospitals (slowing Medicare 
revenue growth at some hospitals), most 
competitor community hospitals appeared 
to compensate for this lost revenue.”10
General and safety net hospital respon-
dents did not report changes in the pro-
vision of care for financially vulnerable 
patients as a result of specialty hospital 
competition. One general hospital each 
in Indianapolis and Little Rock reported 
that competition from specialty hospitals 
has strained their ability to cross-subsidize 
services but did not report limiting care 
to financially vulnerable patients. Many 
respondents noted that competition by spe-
cialty hospitals is only one of many factors 
that affect the financial stability of general 
and safety net hospitals, including cost 
increases outpacing payment rate increases 
from Medicare and Medicaid.
 According to one Indianapolis general 
hospital executive, “Specialty hospitals defi-
nitely have an impact. At the same time you 
have to say the reimbursement levels and 
government programs aren’t going up as 
fast as the cost is going up. Costs are going 
up double digits, but we get a single-digit 
increase on Medicare and things like that. 
You have that as another hurdle that is hav-
ing an impact on your economic health.” 
This assessment was echoed by a Phoenix 
general hospital executive, “If you asked me 
the three-to-five factors on financial per-
formance [in general hospitals], specialty 
hospitals wouldn’t be in that list.”
Implications
To date, the entry of specialty hospitals to 
the Indianapolis, Little Rock and Phoenix 
markets has not had dramatic, adverse 
effects on the financial viability of general 
and safety net hospitals and their ability 
to provide care to financially vulnerable 
populations. However, this seems largely 
To date, the entry of specialty 
hospitals to the Indianapolis, 
Little Rock and Phoenix markets 
has not had dramatic, adverse 
effects on the financial viabil-
ity of general and safety net 
hospitals and their ability to 
provide care to financially vul-
nerable populations.
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because of the ability of general hospitals to 
compensate for the competition in various 
ways. General hospitals likely have enjoyed 
sufficient market leverage in recent years 
to allow them to cost-shift to private payers 
without reducing unprofitable services that 
provide community benefit, such as burn 
units and psychiatric care. 
In the context of the current economic 
recession, however, it is unclear whether 
general hospitals will be able to continue 
cost-shifting to private payers that must 
balance the demands for provider payment 
rate increases with employer-purchaser 
pressures to contain escalating health care 
costs and insurance premiums. General 
hospitals will likely experience an increased 
burden of uncompensated care as job losses 
in the worsening economy are accompanied 
by the loss of health insurance. According 
to one estimate, for every 1 percent increase 
in unemployment, the number of unin-
sured grows by 1.1 million.11 Further, gen-
eral hospitals’ reserves and investment port-
folios, which can help offset increases in 
the cost of uncompensated care, have likely 
lost significant value. As financial con-
straints tighten, general hospitals may seek 
alternative remedies to specialty hospital 
competition, such as economic credential-
ing. Consequently, pending court decisions 
could have significant policy implications 
for the ability of general hospitals to man-
age competition from specialty hospitals. 
Broader market changes and the wors-
ening economic recession—characterized 
by job loss, increased number of uninsured, 
more difficult debt financing, reduced or 
stagnant reimbursement by private payers—
likely will adversely affect specialty hospi-
tals as well. Specialty hospitals burgeoned in 
times of relative economic prosperity. How 
specialty hospitals in the three communities 
will cope with a shrinking base of privately 
insured patients and reductions in elective 
procedures already reported by hospitals 
around the country remains to be seen. 
Severity adjustments to Medicare inpa-
tient hospital payment rates haven’t had a 
noticeable impact on the hospitals in the 
three communities; however, these payment 
changes haven’t been fully phased in. Over 
time, it is possible that severity-adjusted 
payments may prove to do more to sup-
port general hospitals. The continued effort 
by Medicare to accurately price inpatient 
services based on patient acuity will be 
integral to future policy regarding specialty 
hospitals.  Moreover, it will be important 
for policy makers to continue to track the 
impact of specialty hospitals on the ability 
of general hospitals—more so than safety 
net hospitals—to serve financially vulner-
able patients and provide other less-profit-
able but needed services.  
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